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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                     
No. 06-3794
                    
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
DAVID CALHOUN,
Appellant
                    
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 05-cr-00363-6)
District Judge: Hon. Marvin Katz
                     
No. 06-3842
                    
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
PEDRO RISQUET,
Appellant
                    
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 05-cr-00363-4)
District Judge: Hon. Marvin Katz
2                    
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 9, 2008
BEFORE: SMITH, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed:   May 1, 2008)
                    
OPINION
                    
COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Defendants-Appellants David Calhoun and Pedro Risquet were convicted by a jury
of a number of narcotics charges, including, inter alia, conspiracy to distribute more than
five kilograms of cocaine.  They were each sentenced to a 20-year term of imprisonment
and 10 years of supervised release.  Each has appealed.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Calhoun’s appeal was
timely filed, but Risquet’s was not.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).  However, because
the Government does not object on timeliness grounds, we will consider Risquet’s appeal
on the merits.  See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 13 (2005) (per curiam)
(Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33’s seven-day limit for filing new trial motions is
not jurisdictional and may be waived); United States v. Frias, __ F.3d ___, 2008 WL
833973, *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2008) (Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)’s deadline is not jurisdictional,
but is “mandatory and inflexible” when timeliness bar is properly invoked by the
government); United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 744 (10  Cir. 2008) (same); but cf.th
      Estevez is a co-defendant in the case, but pled guilty and testified for the Government1
against Calhoun and Risquet.   
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DL Resources, Inc. v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 214 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007)
(noting open question on issue).  We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
Calhoun asserts claims of sufficiency of the evidence, trial court error, and
prosecutorial misconduct.  Additionally, Risquet alleges trial court error and a violation of
his Sixth Amendment rights.  We address each claim in turn. 
Calhoun contends that he had nothing more than a mere buyer-seller relationship
with Raul Estevez , and thus there is insufficient evidence to support his conspiracy1
conviction.  The standard of review on a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether,
“after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.”  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).  While an
isolated purchase or sale of drugs, without more, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for
conspiracy, “even an occasional ... buyer for redistribution[] can be shown to be a
member of the conspiracy by evidence, direct or inferential, of knowledge that she or he
was part of a larger operation.”  United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 728 (3d Cir. 1994). 
In determining whether this requisite knowledge exists, a factfinder may consider factors
such as: “the length of affiliation between the defendant and the conspiracy; whether
      Risquet lived Union City, New Jersey, just a few miles outside of New York.  2
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there is an established method of payment; the extent to which transactions are
standardized; and whether there is a demonstrated level of mutual trust.”  United States v.
Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 1999).  
The evidence presented at trial indicated that in the six months preceding his
arrest, Calhoun purchased cocaine from Estevez on a monthly basis, in one-kilogram
quantities, for approximately $26,000 per kilogram.  See id. (“[a] large transaction or an
accumulation of deals suggests more trust ... as well as a greater likelihood” that the
parties were engaged in common enterprise).  The exchanges were always arranged
beforehand through coded phone conversations, and always took place at Estevez’s
residence.  Calhoun’s inquiries of “the boy from New York,”  and that he recognized2
Risquet on sight before they both entered Estevez’s residence, where Calhoun obtained a
kilogram of cocaine, all support the inference that Calhoun was aware of Risquet’s role as
Estevez’s supplier.  Furthermore, the evidence showed that on at least one occasion,
Calhoun obtained drugs on credit – paying Estevez a portion of the purchase price up
front and the balance at a later time.  See id. at 200 (“[a] credit relationship ... often
evidences the parties’ mutual stake in each other’s transactions”); United States v.
Carbone, 798 F.2d 21, 27 (1  Cir. 1986) (“[t]he conspiracy began when the cocaine wasst
sold on credit and continued until final payment was made”).  Accordingly, there was
ample evidence upon which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt
5that Calhoun was engaged in a conspiracy to distribute narcotics.  
There is similarly no merit to Calhoun’s argument that the District Court erred
when it denied his request for a continuance of trial.  We review such denials for abuse of
discretion.  United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2007).  Denying a
continuance request is an abuse of discretion “only when it is so arbitrary as to violate due
process.”  United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 507 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Gov’t
of V.I. v. Charleswell, 115 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[t]he matter of a continuance
is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge who must be given wide latitude in
arranging the court’s schedule”).   
Here, two weeks prior to trial, Calhoun filed a pro se continuance motion, alleging
that he and his counsel did not have adequate time to prepare a defense because they were
unable to meet.  However, the Government contended in its opposition that contrary to
this claim, Calhoun and counsel had met on several occasions in the weeks before trial,
and no physical illness or other impediment prevented Calhoun from doing so.  Calhoun
did not proffer anything to contradict these representations, and while his counsel did, at
Calhoun’s request, renew the pro se continuance motion at the start of trial, counsel did
not join in the motion nor express any concerns about inadequate preparation.  On this
record, the District Court’s denial was not an abuse of discretion, nor did it violate
Calhoun’s due process or Sixth Amendment rights.  Cf. United States v. Faison, 679 F.2d
292, 297 (3d Cir. 1982) (where important government witness’s illness prevented his live
6cross-examination, trial court abused its discretion in refusing to continue the trial for a
reasonable period to allow the witness to recover); United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953,
958-59 (7  Cir. 2000) (denial of unopposed continuance was abuse of discretion whereth
postponement was sought because defense counsel had a scheduling conflict; denial
implicated right to choice of counsel as counsel was then forced to withdraw).  
Next, Calhoun and Risquet both claim that the District Court erred in (1) denying
their acquittal motions in the presence of the jury, and (2) in leaving the bench during
trial.  Risquet further contends that the Court’s above actions, coupled with its allegedly
improper remarks pertaining to the flow of the trial constituted structural error.  We
review a trial court’s decisions pertaining to trial management for abuse of discretion. 
Reed v. Phila., Bethlehem & New England R.R. Co., 939 F.2d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1991)
(district courts are “entrusted with wide discretion” in “matters of trial procedure”).  On
the other hand, the question of whether a judge’s absence from the bench arises to a
constitutional structural error is reviewed de novo.  United States v. Mortimer, 161 F.3d
240, 241 (3d Cir. 1998).  However, because none of these claims, with the exception of
the one alleged absence objected to by Calhoun, were raised below, we review only for
plain error.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).  
Calhoun and Risquet argue that the District Court erred when it denied their
respective Rule 29 motions for judgments of acquittal without first excusing the jury. 
While it may be better practice to entertain such legal matters outside the presence of the
7jury, United States v. Coke, 339 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir. 1974), no plain error resulted
here from the failure to do so.  Where all that the jury heard was that Defendants’ “29"
motions were denied, neither Calhoun nor Risquet were prejudiced because jurors would
not have known that the motions pertained to the judge’s perception of the sufficiency of
the prosecution’s evidence, and could not have been unduly swayed as a result.  Cf.
United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F.2d 637, 640-41 (5  Cir. 1976) (cumulative effectth
of commencing the hurried jury trial at 7:30pm, denying a “motion for acquittal” in open
court, and prosecutorial misconduct warranted reversal); Coke, 339 F.2d at 185-86
(judge’s “excessive interference in the examination of witnesses, [] repeated rebukes and
disparaging remarks directed at [defense] counsel,” and denial of “motion for a judgment
of acquittal” in front of the jury violated defendant’s due process rights).   
Nor does the District Judge’s alleged absence warrant reversal.  Where a judge is,
without explanation and without the consent of the parties, physically absent during a
“critical stage” of trial, a structural error occurs and prejudice is presumed.  Mortimer,
161 F.3d at 242 (prosecutor objected during defense’s summation but withdrew objection
upon observing that judge was not in the courtroom).  However, not every judicial
absence arises to an error of constitutional dimension.  E.g., United States v. Burke, 345
F.3d 416, 425 (6  Cir. 2003) (affirming conviction obtained where judge presided overth
portion of proceedings via video-conference); United States v. Grant, 52 F.3d 448, 449
(2d Cir. 1995) (while absence is not favored, it was not error for judge to leave courtroom
8while testimony was read back to jury as “[t]here [was] nothing for the judge to rule on”). 
In this case, during his counsel’s cross-examination of Estevez, Calhoun objected
that the District Judge was not on the bench.  However, the record indicates that the trial
judge responded immediately that he was in fact present in the courtroom.  See Calhoun’s
Supp. App., at 8 (“Mr. Calhoun: I object ... The Judge is not on the bench.  The Court:
Yes, I am.”).  Therefore, no structural error occurred since it appears that the District
Judge was merely outside of Calhoun’s view, was not actually absent from the
proceedings, and certainly did not “completely abdicate[] his judicial responsibilities.” 
United States v. Kone, 307 F.3d 430, 443 (6  Cir. 2002) (no structural error where trialth
judge had another judge preside telephonically over jury deliberations, verdict, and
polling); cf. Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9  Cir. 1995) (reversal warranted whereth
judge was nowhere to be found during jury deliberations; that law clerk presided and
granted the jury’s read-back request demonstrated a “complete absence of judicial
discretion” sufficient to constitute structural error).  
Similarly, Risquet merely alleges that the District Judge left the bench and sat
outside of the view of the jury and the parties a few times during the course of trial, not
that the Judge was physically absent.  Indeed, Risquet expressly concedes that the Judge
was present in the courtroom at all times.  Because his failure to object below means there
is no record of when the absences occurred, and because he fails, even on appeal, to
elaborate upon the circumstances surrounding the alleged absences, Risquet has simply
      Among the comments characterized by Risquet as inappropriate include, inter alia:3
“We have to economize the time of the jury, counsel.  We have to get right down to the
essentials and skip the rest”; “Counsel, get down to the meat of it and no formalities”; and
“This is trivia.  Get to the rest of the story ... We can’t proceed at this pace, it is almost
impossible.”  Risquet’s Opening Brief, at 6 (citing App. at 54, 44, 55-56).  
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failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the complained-of conduct.  See
United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 605 (4  Cir. 1998) (no plain error where judge wasth
in chambers during portions of the closing argument but remained “available to exercise
his discretion with respect to objections made by either side”); Kone, 307 F.3d at 443
(affirming conviction where defendant did not establish that he was prejudiced from
judge’s physical absence from courthouse).
Furthermore, there was no error, plain or otherwise, in the District Court’s remarks
prodding counsel to proceed faster at various points in the trial.   Initially, since five of3
the seven statements identified as inappropriate by Risquet on appeal were actually
directed at the Government, we fail to understand, nor has Risquet explained, how any
such remarks could have prejudiced the defense.  Furthermore, there is nothing improper
in either of the two remarks that were made to Calhoun’s counsel: “[You may continue
only] [i]f it is terribly important.  We have to have some limits”; and “may I ask how
much more [] you have.”  Risquet’s Opening Brief, at 6 (citing App. at 58, 67).  Such
comments do not come close to demonstrating judicial bias, and they certainly did not
deprive Risquet of his right to a fair trial.  See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d
336, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (judge’s comments that defense objections were “frivolous”
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and its evidence was “irrelevant” “did not reach a level of hostility that prevented a fair
trial”); see also United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“a district
judge has wide discretion in monitoring the flow of a criminal trial”). 
Additionally, Calhoun claims the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for Estevez’s
credibility during summation.  To prevail on this claim, Calhoun must demonstrate: (1)
the prosecutor assured the jury that Estevez’s testimony is credible; and (2) the assurance
was based on the prosecutor’s personal knowledge or on other information not found in
the trial record.  United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998).  We review
here only for plain error. 
The prosecutor’s statements that the terms of Estevez’s plea agreement required
his full and truthful cooperation did not constitute vouching.  The agreement was a part of
the Government’s evidence at trial, and the prosecutor’s references to its terms were
therefore permissible argument.  Id. (no vouching occurs “where a prosecutor argues that
a witness is being truthful based on the testimony given at trial”).  Furthermore, the
prosecutor did not err in saying to the jury: “I suggest to you that Estevez’s testimony
rang true.  You are to decide.”  Calhoun’s Supp. App., at 11; see Walker, 155 F.3d at 188
(a phrase like “I submit to you” is “merely a method of prefacing an argument and does
not by itself constitute vouching ... it ... does not assure the jury that the witness is
credible, but instead asks the jury to find that the witness was credible”) (emphasis in
original).  Moreover, the Government’s summation did not reference information
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contained outside the trial record, and the Court duly instructed the jury that they were the
sole judges of credibility.  Viewed in the context of the entirety of the proceedings, the
challenged statements were not erroneous; even if they were, they were not sufficiently
“serious as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and to contribute to a
miscarriage of justice” so as to warrant reversal.  United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d
1084, 1126 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Beaty,
722 F.2d 1090, 1097 (3d Cir. 1983) (even where prosecutor’s statement that cooperators
“promised to tell the truth and were telling the truth” constituted vouching, no prejudice
resulted since the cooperators’ credibility “was a hotly contested issue” at trial and thus
the jury was more likely to view the statement as argument).  
Finally, Risquet contends that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment
right at sentencing when it relied on his criminal history in determining that he was
subject to a 20-year mandatory minimum.  This argument is clearly foreclosed by
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which remains valid and
binding precedent.  United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 104 (3d Cir. 2007).  
In conclusion, finding the claims of error to be without merit, we affirm the
judgments of the District Court. 
